Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations and Deliberate Failures of Outcome: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism
Ayman Ghoneim (SoCS CECS)
CS HDR MONITORING AI Research GroupDATE: 2010-04-15
TIME: 14:30:00 - 15:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU
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ABSTRACT:
In informational decentralized environments, rational and selfish agents have their private information, and can strategically misrepresent their information aiming for a more biased outcome toward their own interests. In such settings, mechanism design is considered a powerful tool for defining the rules that will govern the agents' interactions and their reporting strategies, while guaranteeing some desirable outcome for the whole system. Classical mechanism design normally assumes that the determined outcome can be enforced. In many practical instances, this assumption is violated.
In this talk, we introduce a novel strategy-proof mechanism for settings where the outcome may face deliberate failures, and agents have interdependent valuations.
BIO:
PhD student in Computer Science.
